… Ex-combatants Reveal How Distorted Quranic Teachings, Osolation, Threats Kept Them Trapped in Terrorist Camps
…. From Surrender To Reintegration: Why Leaving The Bush May Be EasierThan Rebuilding Life At home
Daud Olatunji
For more than a decade, the name Sambisa Forest has evoked images of violence, abductions and insurgency.
But behind the military operations, attacks and displacement lies another story — that of young men and women who entered Boko Haram’s orbit, some voluntarily and others after being forced into the group, only to discover that leaving could be as difficult as joining.
Interviews with former Boko Haram members who surrendered in Borno State reveal a pattern of coercion, isolation, fear and ideological indoctrination that helped keep recruits inside terrorist enclaves.
Some said they were told they were fighting a religious war. Others said they were threatened with death or warned that soldiers would kill them if they escaped.
For some, however, the turning point came through family pressure, government messages, exposure to life outside the camps and growing disillusionment with the violence they had been taught to embrace.
Their accounts provide a rare insight into the human machinery behind an insurgency that has devastated communities across Nigeria’s North-East and spilled into the wider Lake Chad Basin.
One former fighter, identified as Liman, said he never planned to become a Boko Haram member.
In 2014, while attempting to flee Kukawa in northern Borno amid fears of a military raid, he was intercepted by insurgents at Kross Kawa.
He and others were taken into the bush, questioned about their knowledge of the Quran and separated into groups.
According to him, the recruits were told that they had been taken there to “do Allah’s work.”
His telephone was confiscated.
For about two months, he could not contact his family.
When he eventually learnt that both his parents had died, and that he had also lost a brother, he said his circumstances became even more difficult.
The loss, coupled with his isolation, made escape appear increasingly impossible.
Liman’s experience reflects one of the central problems confronting efforts to defeat violent extremism: not everyone inside an insurgent camp entered through the same door.
Some are committed ideologues. Others may be collaborators, coerced recruits, abductees, family members or people drawn into armed groups because of social and economic pressures.
That distinction has become critical to the rehabilitation debate.
A war sustained by misinformation
Another former Boko Haram cleric, Malam Bashir, described what he said was an internal system of religious indoctrination.
Bashir claimed that his disagreements with the late Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, over the interpretation of Islamic teachings eventually resulted in his imprisonment and a death sentence.
He said he was told that he would be executed after Sallah.
His account illustrates the danger of treating terrorist ideology simply as religious conviction.
Bashir and other former members said distorted interpretations of Islam were used to legitimise violence, reject democratic institutions and discourage fighters from abandoning the organisation.
They also alleged that commanders deliberately spread frightening stories about what would happen to anyone who surrendered.
According to Bashir, fighters were warned that the military would kill them and that the government would subject them to harmful treatment.
Such claims, whether believed initially or reinforced through repeated exposure, served one important purpose: keeping members inside the group.
The information war
The accounts of the former fighters suggest that defeating insurgency is not only a matter of military confrontation.
It is also an information battle.
When people inside an isolated environment receive information almost exclusively from their commanders, those commanders can shape how the outside world is perceived.
Family members, government agencies, religious leaders and former combatants therefore have a role in breaking the information barrier.
Some of the former fighters interviewed said government messages distributed around insurgent enclaves encouraged them to surrender.
Others said contact with relatives was decisive.
Idrissa, another former combatant, said appeals from his mother and friends through social media strengthened his determination to return home.
His experience demonstrates the importance of maintaining safe channels through which families can communicate with relatives still trapped in violent groups.
Why some finally surrendered
For Liman, the decision came after years of living under the control of the insurgents.
He eventually left his weapon behind and told his commanders that he was taking his wives and children to the farm.
The journey out of the camp was difficult, but he eventually reached a military position and surrendered.
Other former fighters described similar combinations of frustration, fear, family pressure and exposure to alternative narratives.
This is significant because it suggests that surrender may occur when the perceived benefits of remaining in an armed group begin to collapse while a credible alternative becomes visible.
The alternative must, however, be more than a promise.
A former fighter leaving an insurgent camp may have no education, no marketable skill, no home to return to and no guarantee that neighbours will accept him.
The price paid by communities
The reintegration debate cannot be separated from the enormous cost imposed on victims.
The Boko Haram conflict has produced a prolonged humanitarian crisis across the Lake Chad Basin.
The United Nations Development Programme says the violence has created a social, political, security and humanitarian crisis that may last for years. It has consequently supported programmes aimed at screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of people associated with Boko Haram and ISWAP.
The UNHCR reported in July 2026 that more than 3.5 million people were forcibly displaced across the Lake Chad Basin, while 8.2 million required humanitarian assistance. It also said security incidents across the Basin rose by 80 per cent between January 2024 and April 2026.
Borno remains at the centre of the crisis.
That reality makes reintegration politically and emotionally difficult.
For a survivor who lost a parent, child, spouse, home or livelihood to insurgency, seeing a former combatant return to the community can trigger anger, fear and distrust.
Consequently, reconciliation cannot simply mean releasing former fighters and sending them home.
The Borno Model
Against this background, the Borno State Government has pursued what it calls the Borno Model, a non-kinetic approach designed to encourage insurgents to surrender and subsequently undergo rehabilitation and reintegration.
According to figures supplied by the state government and contained in the source material for this report, more than 100,000 insurgents and members of their families have surrendered since the initiative began in 2021.
The government also says 9,680 low-risk former fighters and family members have been reintegrated into communities.
Those figures should be understood as government-reported programme figures rather than a comprehensive independent count of all people who have left Boko Haram or ISWAP.
The model centres on disarmament, demobilisation and deradicalisation, followed by reintegration.
The state’s Special Adviser on Security, Brig.-Gen. Abdullahi Ishaq (retd.), said surrendered fighters undergo religious reorientation, lessons on Nigerian law, discussions on community values and vocational training.
The skills include carpentry, phone repairs, welding, metalwork, plumbing, pottery and barbing.
Community leaders are also involved in determining whether former fighters can return to their communities.
That community component is particularly important.
Why community acceptance matters
UNDP’s experience in Borno provides evidence that reintegration is not simply about the former combatant.
Its programmes have involved traditional and religious leaders, community sensitisation and mechanisms intended to reduce rejection and stigmatisation.
In 2022, UNDP said its reintegration activities helped 3,447 returnees, including 1,450 women, reintegrate into communities in Bama, Konduga, Gwoza and other parts of Borno.
The organisation has also supported livelihood programmes, psychosocial services and community activities involving former associates of violent extremist groups, internally displaced persons and host communities.
The lesson is clear: reintegration is more likely to succeed when the receiving community is prepared for it.
But rehabilitation does not erase accountability
One of the most delicate issues is how Nigeria balances forgiveness with justice.
Not every person who leaves an armed group can automatically be treated in the same way.
The UNDP has emphasised the importance of screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration processes in the Lake Chad Basin.
Nigeria has also prosecuted people linked to Boko Haram.
In 2024, Nigerian authorities announced convictions in a mass terrorism trial involving 125 defendants, with charges including terrorism, terrorism financing and crimes linked to the International Criminal Court framework.
This distinction is essential.
A person forcibly recruited into an armed group cannot necessarily be treated in the same manner as a commander or individual who voluntarily planned or carried out serious crimes.
Effective reintegration therefore requires credible screening and accountability alongside rehabilitation.
The children are the next test
Perhaps the most consequential part of the rehabilitation process concerns children.
Idrissa told the source publication that he had enrolled his 10 children in school after leaving Boko Haram.
That development is more than a family achievement.
It represents an attempt to interrupt the intergenerational transmission of extremist ideology.
A child who grows up inside a terrorist enclave may have known little of ordinary schooling, civic life or alternative interpretations of religion.
Taking such children into classrooms can therefore become part of a much broader deradicalisation strategy.
But school enrolment alone is insufficient.
Children returning from conflict environments may require psychosocial support, educational assessment, family assistance and protection from stigma.
Livelihoods could determine whether surrender lasts
The North-East Civil Society Organisations Forum Chairman, Ahmed Shehu, has urged greater emphasis on farming and other livelihoods for repentant fighters.
The argument is straightforward.
A former combatant who leaves an insurgent group but has no means of survival may become vulnerable to exploitation or recruitment again.
UNDP’s stabilisation work in conflict-affected Borno similarly links reintegration with livelihoods, local economic recovery, governance, infrastructure and access to basic services. Its work on the rebuilding of Ngarannam, for example, combines community reconstruction with economic opportunities, education, healthcare and governance.
The broader lesson is that deradicalisation cannot be separated from development.
A vocational certificate without tools, capital or access to customers may have little value.
Agricultural training without land, irrigation, inputs or markets may also fail to create sustainable livelihoods.
The unresolved question: can the peace hold?
The surrender of large numbers of insurgents is undoubtedly significant.
But it does not mean the insurgency has disappeared.
Recent violence across the Lake Chad Basin demonstrates that armed extremist groups remain capable of mounting deadly attacks.
In May 2026, an attack on a military post in Chad’s Lake Chad region killed 23 soldiers and injured 26 others, according to Chadian authorities reported by the Associated Press.
UNHCR also warned in July 2026 that violence and displacement were increasing across the wider Lake Chad Basin.
The continued existence of armed groups means reintegration programmes must operate alongside effective security measures.
What the evidence suggests
The experiences of the former fighters and the broader evidence point to several lessons for Nigeria.
First, surrender must be followed by rigorous screening.
The government must distinguish between people who were forcibly recruited or held against their will and those suspected of committing serious crimes.
Second, reintegration must be community-based.
Traditional rulers, religious leaders, women, youth groups, victims’ representatives and local authorities should have structured roles in the process.
Third, livelihoods are not optional.
Former fighters need realistic economic opportunities if reintegration is expected to last.
Fourth, education must be central.
Children associated with insurgent groups require accelerated access to safe and quality education.
Fifth, psychosocial support should be sustained.
Years spent in violent environments can leave people struggling to adapt to civilian life. Reintegration therefore requires more than religious lectures and vocational training.
A reintegration programme that focuses entirely on former fighters while neglecting survivors risks creating resentment and undermining public confidence.
Victims and host communities need their own programmes for compensation, livelihoods, reconstruction and psychosocial recovery.
From surrender to sustainable peace
The most revealing testimony from the former Boko Haram fighters is not simply that they escaped.
It is that they eventually discovered an alternative to the world that had been presented to them.
Their stories suggest that terrorist organisations survive not only through weapons and violence but also through control of information, isolation, identity and hope.
That means the counter-insurgency response must also compete in those areas.
Government must offer credible alternatives before people are recruited, provide safe exit routes for those seeking to leave, screen and rehabilitate eligible returnees, hold perpetrators accountable, support victims and give communities the resources to recover.
The ultimate test of the Borno Model will therefore not be the number of people who surrender.
It will be whether those who surrender remain out of the insurgency, whether their children grow up outside the cycle of violence, whether communities can accept their return, and whether victims can rebuild their lives without feeling abandoned.
After more than a decade of insurgency, Borno’s greatest victory may not be simply emptying terrorist camps.
It may be making civilian life sufficiently safe, dignified and economically viable that those who leave the bush have no reason to return.
For a fully publishable investigative/special-report package, I would recommend presenting the report with a data box containing: Boko Haram’s estimated fatalities and displacement since 2009; Borno’s annual surrender/reintegration figures; number of people screened versus accepted/rejected; number prosecuted; number receiving vocational training; number of children enrolled in school; and any available data on recidivism or return to insurgency. Those are the areas where the present material is weakest and where PLATFORM TIMES could add original reporting value.
The UN evidence is particularly useful because it shows that the issue is not merely a Borno rehabilitation story: the crisis remains regional, with 3.5 million forcibly displaced and 8.2 million people requiring humanitarian assistance across the Lake Chad Basin as of the latest UNHCR assessment.
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